This information is indicative and can be subject to change.
Advanced game theory
Teacher: Joseph Abdou
E-mail: abdou@univ-paris1.fr
ECTS: 2.5
Evaluation: Presentation of papers and/or a written exam .
Previsional Place and time:
Prerequisites: A good training in measure theory, probability theory and discrete time martingales is highly recommended
Aim of the course: This course presents the main concepts of games of incomplete information(
Teaching Method: Lectures by the teacher and presentation of articles by students, Oral & Written Communications Content).
Syllabus: Models of information, games of incomplete information, the Model of repeated games, strategies, Repreated zero-sum games with lack of information from one side, value, Asymptotic value and optimal behavior. Definition, Existence.
Texts and References:
Aumann, Maschler Stearns: Repeated Games with incomplete information, MIT Press 1995
Sorin: A first course in zero-Sum repeated games, Springer Verlag
Advanced game theory
Teacher: Joseph Abdou
E-mail: abdou@univ-paris1.fr
ECTS: 2.5
Evaluation: Presentation of papers and/or a written exam .
Previsional Place and time:
Prerequisites: A good training in measure theory, probability theory and discrete time martingales is highly recommended
Aim of the course: This course presents the main concepts of games of incomplete information(
Teaching Method: Lectures by the teacher and presentation of articles by students, Oral & Written Communications Content).
Syllabus: Models of information, games of incomplete information, the Model of repeated games, strategies, Repreated zero-sum games with lack of information from one side, value, Asymptotic value and optimal behavior. Definition, Existence.
Texts and References:
Aumann, Maschler Stearns: Repeated Games with incomplete information, MIT Press 1995
Sorin: A first course in zero-Sum repeated games, Springer Verlag
